Officers may conduct a search limited for weapons when they observe unusual conduct leading them to reasonably suspect criminal activity is afoot and the individual(s) involved is/are armed.
Reasoning:
An officer may identify himself as the police and make initial inquiries. This conduct is proper when the officer observes conduct leading him to develop reasonable suspicion that a crime is occurring or about to occur. If the officer believes a threat to himself of others still exists after such an inquiry, a limited search may be performed to find weapons.
The Court held that an individual is seized when stopped by a police officer on the street because he is not free to walk away. As a result, the Fourth Amendment protections prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures apply. The Court also stated that a “pat down” of outer clothing constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court held that the constitutionality of the search depended on whether or not the scope of the search was reasonable in light of the circumstances. The test used to determine reasonableness is that the interest in officer safety must outweigh the suspect’s Fourth Amendment right to privacy.
The Court held that an officer’s interest in the safety of himself and others outweighs an individual’s Fourth Amendment right. In addition, when an individual is stopped on the street, the police may conduct a proper search for weapons if based on the facts and circumstances, the officer reasonably believes the person is armed.
Here, considering the circumstances, it was reasonable for the experienced officer to suspect the two men were planning a robbery. In addition, the government’s interest in law enforcement trumps any minimal invasion of privacy each may have experienced when approached by the officer. The Court also determined the pat-down was reasonable as the officer’s initial concerns were not abated as a result of the responses given. The officer stated that the pat down was conducted under the belief either men could have been armed.
As a result, it was proper for the officer to conduct a searched for weapons, as the interest in the safety of the officer and the public outweighed any privacy right the individuals had under the 4th Amendment.
It would be hard to overestimate the effect of Terry on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The Court not only permitted stops and frisks on less than probable cause; it also explicitly invoked the reasonableness clause over the warrant clause as the governing standard. Perhaps the Court intended to limit use of the reasonableness clause and its balancing approach to the area of stop and frisk; but once that balancing process was launched in one area, it became difficult to prevent its application to other searches and seizures. See Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 Minn.L.Rev. 383 (1988) (noting that Terry has led, in time, to a general diminution of Fourth Amendment protection).
(police harassment of urban minorities)
Bright Line Rule (Hicks)s Under Terry- Pennsylvania v. Mimms 227
[6] Contrary to the suggestion in the dissent of our Brother STEVENS, post, at 122, we do not hold today that "whenever an officer has an occasion to speak with the driver of a vehicle, he may also order the driver out of the car."
Mimms and Passengers 229
… The Supreme Court has held that "an officer making a traffic stop may order 1295
passengers
to get out of the car pending completion of the stop." Maryland
v. Wilson, 519 US 408, 415 … US
v. Gibbs
The Supreme Court's decision in New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 106 S. Ct. 960 89 L. Ed. 2d 81 (1986) is instructive. In Class, a police officer reached into the defendant's vehicle to move a piece of paper that was obstructing the exterior view of the VIN.[5] Id. at 108. The Court agreed with the lower court and found that the intrusion into that space constituted a "search." Id. at 115. The Court explained that "while the interior of an automobile is not subject to the same expectations of privacy that exist with respect to one's home, a car's interior as a whole is nonetheless subject to Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable intrusions by the police." Id. 114-15. The Court ultimately found the search was reasonable, and thus not a constitutional violation, because the search was the least intrusive means necessary to satisfy the greater governmental interest in obtaining the VIN of the vehicle. Id. at 116-19. The Court in Class concluded by saying:
, Generally, in order to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, "an official seizure of the person must be supported by probable cause, even if no formal arrest is made." Summers, 452 U.S. at 696, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 204, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979)). However, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that "some seizures significantly less intrusive than an arrest have withstood scrutiny under the reasonableness standard embodied in the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 697, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). "In these cases the intrusion on the citizen's privacy `was so much less severe' than that involved in a traditional arrest that `the opposing interest in crime prevention and detection and in police officer safety' could support the seizure as reasonable." Id. at 697-98, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (quoting Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 209, 99 S.Ct. 2248).
The Bailey Court found it unnecessary to decide how far beyond the premises the Summers power to detain residents could extend.
Pdf-Bailey v. United States: Drawing an Exception in the Context of Off-Premises Detentions Incident to Search Warrants
"[O]fficers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority `to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.'" Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005) (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981)).
The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...." The landmark United States Supreme Court decision, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), established that while the brief detention of a person by a police officer may be an unconstitutional seizure, a detention is nevertheless proper as long as the police officer has a reasonable suspicion based upon objective, articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot. "The Fourth Amendment's requirement that ... seizures be founded upon an objective justification, governs all seizures of the person, `including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest.'" United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (citations omitted). Of course, not all interactions between police officers and a citizen involve seizures of that person. Id. at 552, 100 S.Ct. 1870. The Fourth Amendment's 675*675 safeguards may be invoked only when a person's freedom of movement is restrained by means of physical force or a show of authority. Id. at 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16, 88 S.Ct. 1868). "The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not to eliminate all contact between the police and the citizenry, but `to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals.'" Id. at 553-54, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976)). As explained by the United States Supreme Court in Mendenhall, id. at 551-52, 100 S.Ct. 1870, and this Court in Strange v. Commonwealth, 269 S.W.3d 847, 851 (Ky. 2008), if a citizen was seized when the officer approached and asked questions, the officer's conduct in doing so was constitutional only if the citizen was reasonably suspected of wrongdoing based on objective, articulable facts.[2], Commonwealth v. Perry, 630 SW 3d 671 - Ky: Supreme Court 2021
The Court agrees with the parties that this is the central issue. This is because "statements given during a period of illegal detention are inadmissible even though voluntarily given if they are the product of the illegal detention and not the result of an independent act of free will." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983) (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218-19, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601-02, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975)). Thus, if Defendant's detention was not consensual, all of the evidence derived from what followed would likely be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963) (the test for the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is "whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."). Accordingly, the Court will focus its attention solely on this question.[6], US v. Carroll, Dist. Court, MD Louisiana 2018
Moreover, the appropriate inquiry is whether the challenged conduct objectively manifests an intent to restrain, for we rarely probe the subjective motivations of police officers in the Fourth Amendment context. See Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U. S. ___, ___, 139 S.Ct. 1715, 1724-25, 204 L.Ed.2d 1 (2019). Only an objective test "allows the police to determine in advance whether the conduct contemplated will implicate the Fourth Amendment." Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988). While a mere touch can be enough for a seizure, the amount of force remains pertinent in assessing the objective intent to restrain. A tap on the shoulder to get one's attention will rarely exhibit such an intent. See INS v. Delgado, 466 999*999 U.S. 210, 220, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984); Jones, 35 N.C., at 448-449. Nor does the seizure depend on the subjective perceptions of the seized person. Here, for example, Torres claims to have perceived the officers' actions as an attempted carjacking. But the conduct of the officers—ordering Torres to stop and then shooting to restrain her movement —satisfies the objective test for a seizure, regardless whether Torres comprehended the governmental character of their actions. The rule we announce today is narrow. In addition to the requirement of intent to restrain, a seizure by force— absent submission—lasts only as long as the application of force. That is to say that the Fourth Amendment does not recognize any "continuing arrest during the period of fugitivity." Hodari D., 499 U.S., at 625, 111 S.Ct. 1547. The fleeting nature of some seizures by force undoubtedly may inform what damages a civil plaintiff may recover, and what evidence a criminal defendant may exclude from trial. See, e.g., Utah v. Strieff, 579 U. S. ___, ___, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 2060-61, 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016). But brief seizures are seizures all the same., Torres v. Madrid, 2021
Would you think that the failure to cooperate in an encounter might be treated by the officers as suspicious conduct that would give rise to a more extensive investigation? The Court in Royer stated that the failure to cooperate in a consensual encounter cannot be treated as suspicious conduct that would justify a Terry stop. Otherwise, the officers would have it both ways: an encounter would be permissible because it is consensual, and yet a stop would be permissible when the individual refuses to consent. But how many people actually know that officers cannot treat as suspicious a person's refusal to cooperate in an encounter? And even if not permitted under the law to treat non-cooperation as suspicious, how many officers do in fact treat non-cooperation as a reason for detaining an individual?
So the court held that the test for a Terry stop is not really whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave, but rather whether the police officer was acting coercively
Not every interaction between a police officer and a citizen constitutes a seizure triggering Fourth Amendment protections. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382; Cardoza, 129 F.3d at 14; Young, 105 F.3d at 5. While per se rules are inappropriate in determining when a seizure occurs for Fourth Amendment purposes, United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002) (citing Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439, 111 S.Ct. 2382), we have observed that encounters "between law enforcement officials and citizens generally fall[] within three tiers of Fourth Amendment analysis, depending on the level of police intrusion into a person's privacy." Young, 105 F.3d at 5. Because there are no bright-line distinctions between the tiers, we look to the totality of the circumstances to determine where a police encounter falls. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 207, 122 S.Ct. 2105; Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988); United States v. Smith, 423 F.3d 25, 29-30 (1st Cir.2005); Cardoza, 129 F.3d at 15. See also Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439-40, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (rejecting per se rule for seizure in favor of totality inquiry)., US v. Ford, 548 F. 3d 1 - Court of Appeals, 1st Circuit 2008
There are legal fictions and there are legal fictions. One means of differentiating good from bad legal fictions is their relationship to reality * * *. By that measure, in light of the available evidence, the consensual encounter doctrine paints a false picture of reality as applied to encounters involving investigation of the individual being questioned. In so doing, it mislocates the dividing line between freedom and restraint, including on the "freedom" side of this line many people who are effectively restrained or-to put it another way-are restrained in all but the eyes of the law.
Pdf, The Wrong Line Between Freedom and Restraint: The Unreality, Obscurity, and Hcivility of the Fourth Amendment Consensual Encounter Doctrine
United States v. Drayton 243
If a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter, then he or she has not been seized.
- in United States v. Crossley, 2008
"[T] he voluntariness of a consent to search depends on whether—given the totality of relevant circumstances— `a reasonable person would understand that he or she [was] free to refuse'consent. "
- in State v. Smith, 2015
The Court has rejected in specific terms the suggestion that police officers must always inform citizens of their right to refuse when seeking permission to conduct a warrantless consent search
- in US v. Schaefer, 2012
"Even when law enforcement officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may pose questions, ask for identification, and request consent to search luggage—provided they do not induce cooperation by coercive means
Florida v. Bostick 501 U.S. 429 (1991)
However, "not every interaction between a police officer and a citizen is protected by the Fourth Amendment. An encounter `will not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its consensual nature... `Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a `seizure'has …
- in US v. WESSELHOFT, 2016 and 121 similar citations
Encounters occur when police officers approach an individual in a public place to ask questions, request identification, or request consent to search as long as the interaction is consensual—that is, as long as an officer does not convey a message that compliance with the officer's request is required.
- in Cole v. State, 2008 and 45 similar citations
PDF, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion
In applying these principles to the dismissal of petitioners' Fourth Amendment complaint for failure to state a claim, we can sustain the District Court's action only if, taking the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to petitioners, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 236 (1974), we nonetheless conclude that they could prove no set of facts entitling them to relief for a "seizure." See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Petitioners have alleged the establishment of a roadblock crossing both lanes of the highway. In marked contrast to a police car pursuing with flashing lights, or to a policeman in the road signaling an oncoming car to halt, see Kibbe v. Springfield, 777 F. 2d 801, 802-803 (CA1 1985), cert. dism'd, 480 U. S. 257 (1987), a roadblock is not just a significant show of authority to induce a voluntary stop, but is designed to produce a stop by physical impact if voluntary compliance does not occur. It may well be that respondents here preferred, and indeed earnestly hoped, that Brower would stop on his own, without striking the barrier, but we do not think it practicable to conduct such an inquiry into subjective intent. See United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 922, n. 23 (1984); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 641 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 815-819 (1982). Nor do we think it possible, in determining whether there has been a seizure in a case such as this, to distinguish between a roadblock that is designed to give the oncoming driver the option of a voluntary stop (e. g., one at the end of a long straightaway), and a roadblock that is designed precisely to produce a collision (e. g., one located just around a bend). In determining whether the means that terminates the freedom of movement is the very means that the government intended we cannot draw too fine a line, or we will be driven to saying that one is not seized who has been 599*599 stopped by the accidental discharge of a gun with which he was meant only to be bludgeoned, or by a bullet in the heart that was meant only for the leg. We think it enough for a seizure that a person be stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in place in order to achieve that result. It was enough here, therefore, that, according to the allegations of the complaint, Brower was meant to be stopped by the physical obstacle of the roadblock — and that he was so stopped.
This is not to say that the precise character of the roadblock is irrelevant to further issues in this case. "Seizure" alone is not enough for § 1983 liability; the seizure must be "unreasonable." Petitioners can claim the right to recover for Brower's death only because the unreasonableness they allege consists precisely of setting up the roadblock in such manner as to be likely to kill him. This should be contrasted with the situation that would obtain if the sole claim of unreasonableness were that there was no probable cause for the stop. In that case, if Brower had had the opportunity to stop voluntarily at the roadblock, but had negligently or intentionally driven into it, then, because of lack of proximate causality, respondents, though responsible for depriving him of his freedom of movement, would not be liable for his death. See Martinez v. California, 444 U. S. 277, 285 (1980); Cameron v. Pontiac, 813 F. 2d 782, 786 (CA6 1987). Thus, the circumstances of this roadblock, including the allegation that headlights were used to blind the oncoming driver, may yet determine the outcome of this case.
The complaint here sufficiently alleges that respondents, under color of law, sought to stop Brower by means of a roadblock and succeeded in doing so. That is enough to constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for consideration of whether the District Court properly dismissed the Fourth Amendment claim 600*600 on the basis that the alleged roadblock did not effect a seizure that was "unreasonable."
A police officer may make a seizure by a show of authority and without the use of physical force, but there is no seizure without actual submission; otherwise there is at most an attempted seizure, so far as the Fourth Amendment is concerned
"For the duration of a traffic stop, a police officer effectively seizes `everyone in the vehicle,'the driver and all passengers. "
- in US v. Alvarado, 2016
A person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the government's action under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, "`by means of physical force or show of authority,'" terminates or restrains his freedom of movement, Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)), "through means intentionally applied," Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989) (emphasis in original). Thus, an "unintended person ... [may be] the object of the detention," so long as the detention is "willful" and not merely the consequence of "an unknowing act." Id., at 596, 109 S.Ct. 1378; cf. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (no seizure where a police officer accidentally struck and killed a motorcycle passenger during a high-speed pursuit). A police officer may make a seizure by a show of authority and without the use of physical force, but there is no seizure without actual submission; otherwise, there is at most an attempted seizure, so far as the Fourth Amendment is concerned. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, n. 2, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991); Lewis, supra, at 844, 845, n. 7, 118 S.Ct. 1708.
When the actions of the police do not show an unambiguous intent to restrain or when an individual's submission to a show of governmental authority takes the form of passive acquiescence, there needs to be some test for telling when a seizure occurs in response to authority, and when it does not. The test was devised by Justice Stewart in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980), who wrote that a seizure occurs if "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave," id., at 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (principal opinion). Later on, the Court adopted Justice Stewart's touchstone, see, e.g., Hodari D., supra, at 627, 111 S.Ct. 1547; Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984), but added that when a person "has no desire to leave" for reasons unrelated to the police presence, the "coercive effect of the encounter" can be measured better by asking whether "a reasonable person would feel 2406*2406 free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter," Bostick, supra, at 435-436, 111 S.Ct. 2382; see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 202, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002).
The law is settled that in Fourth Amendment terms a traffic stop entails a seizure of the driver "even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). And although we have not, until today, squarely answered the question whether a passenger is also seized, we have said over and over in dicta that during a traffic stop an officer seizes everyone in the vehicle, not just the driver. See, e.g., Prouse, supra, at 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391 ("[S]topping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a `seizure' within the meaning of [the Fourth and Fourteenth] Amendments"); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 4, n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 42, 66 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (per curiam) ("There can be no question that the stopping of a vehicle and the detention of its occupants constitute a `seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment"); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436-437, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) ("[W]e have long acknowledged that stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a seizure" (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985) ("[S]topping a car and detaining its occupants constitute a seizure"); Whren, supra, at 809-810, 116 S.Ct. 1769 ("Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a `seizure' of `persons' within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment]").
The Suspect Who Does Not Submit California v. Hodari D. 499 U.S. 621 (1991) 251
Respondent contends that his position is sustained by the so-called Mendenhall test, formulated by Justice Stewart's opinion in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 554 (1980), and adopted by the Court in later cases, see Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U. S. 567, 573 (1988); INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210, 215 (1984): "[A] person has been `seized' within the 628*628 meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." 446 U. S., at 554. See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 502 (1983) (opinion of WHITE, J.). In seeking to rely upon that test here, respondent fails to read it carefully. It says that a person has been seized "only if," not that he has been seized "whenever"; it states a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for seizure—or, more precisely, for seizure effected through a "show of authority." Mendenhall establishes that the test for existence of a "show of authority" is an objective one: not whether the citizen perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but whether the officer's words and actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable person. Application of this objective test was the basis for our decision in the other case principally relied upon by respondent, Chesternut, supra, where we concluded that the police cruiser's slow following of the defendant did not convey the message that he was not free to disregard the police and go about his business. We did not address in Chesternut, however, the question whether, if the Mendenhall test was met—if the message that the defendant was not free to leave had been conveyed—a Fourth Amendment seizure would have occurred. See 486 U. S., at 577 (KENNEDY, J., concurring).
Quite relevant to the present case, however, was our decision in Brower v. Inyo County, 489 U. S. 593, 596 (1989). In that case, police cars with flashing lights had chased the decedent for 20 miles—surely an adequate "show of authority"—but he did not stop until his fatal crash into a police-erected blockade. The issue was whether his death could be held to be the consequence of an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. We did not even consider the possibility that a seizure could have occurred during the course of the chase because, as we explained, that "show of authority" did not produce his stop. Id., at 597. And we discussed, 629*629 ibid., an opinion of Justice Holmes, involving a situation not much different from the present case, where revenue agents had picked up containers dropped by moonshiners whom they were pursuing without adequate warrant. The containers were not excluded as the product of an unlawful seizure because "[t]he defendant's own acts, and those of his associates, disclosed the jug, the jar and the bottle—and there was no seizure in the sense of the law when the officers examined the contents of each after they had been abandoned." Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57, 58 (1924). The same is true here.
In sum, assuming that Pertoso's pursuit in the present case constituted a "show of authority" enjoining Hodari to halt, since Hodari did not comply with that injunction he was not seized until he was tackled. The cocaine abandoned while he was running was in this case not the fruit of a seizure, and his motion to exclude evidence of it was properly denied. We reverse the decision of the California Court of Appeal, and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Pdf "Black and Blue Encounters" Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?
US v. Lender 985 F.2d 151 (1993)
In appealing the denial of his suppression motion, Lender argues that Officers Hill and Thornell had no reasonable suspicion to stop him early in the morning of August 11. At most, the defendant maintains, the officers saw a man talking with friends on a street corner in a poor section of town, and the man happened to have his hand out. According to the defendant, these facts did not provide a "particularized and objective basis" for suspecting him of criminal conduct, which Officer Hill needed to order him to stop. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981).
We disagree. Reasonable suspicion is a commonsensical proposition. Courts are not remiss in crediting the practical experience of officers who observe on a daily basis what transpires on the street. Here, the officers personally knew that the area they were patrolling had a large amount of drug traffic. While the defendant's mere presence in a high crime area is not by itself enough to raise reasonable suspicion, an area's propensity toward criminal activity is something that an officer may consider. United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1107 (4th Cir.1987); United States v. Constantine, 567 F.2d 266, 267 (4th Cir.1977). The officers also observed the defendant in this known drug area at nearly 1:00 a.m. The lateness of the hour is another fact that may raise the level of suspicion. See United States v. Knox, 950 F.2d 516, 519 (8th Cir.1991).
also US v. Griffin 652 F.3d 793
a person is seized only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained....[A] `show of authority'alone is insufficient; an officer's show of authority becomes a seizure only if the person at whom it is directed actually submits to that authority
- in BROOKS-ALBRECHTSEN v. Mitchell, 2016
A seizure may be effected in either of two ways: "through physical force...[or] through a show of authority and submission to the assertion of authority."
- in US v. Mays, 2016
Pdf, Everyman's Fourth Amendment: Privacy Or Mutual Trust between Government and Citizen