Chapter 3. Self-Incrimination and Confessions................................................... 647
As discussed above, the Court became dissatisfied with the due process-totality of the circumstances test as an exclusive means of regulating confessions. After Spano, the Court applied the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to exclude two confessions. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). But Sixth Amendment protection does not begin until there is a "criminal prosecution"-the Court came to doubt whether that Amendment's protections could apply to the investigatory stage, before the defendant has been formally accused of a crime. And it is during the investigatory stage that most police interrogation occurs and most confessions are obtained. The Court therefore began to shift to a different constitutional amendment-the Fifth Amendment, which is not temporally limited to criminal prosecutions.9
The Massiah Court held that the "petitioner was denied the basic protections of [the Sixth Amendment] when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel." - in US v. Williamson, 2013
In Escobedo the Court stated, "We hold only that when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory—when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession—our adversary system begins to operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer." - in United States v. Hill, 1966
—the Supreme Court held that the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of [a] defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. - in US v. Pryor, 2013
"Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at anytime prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.... If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." - in United States v. Lewis, 1977
In: Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993), the Court downplayed the e:ots of deciding Miranda issues, as it held that Miranda claims can be pursued on collateral review of a state court conviction. Justice Souter, writing for five Justices, concluded if Miranda claims were baned on habeas it "would not significantly benefit the federal courts." Justice Souter explained this assertion as follows:
[E]liminating habeas review of Miranda issues would not prevent a state prisoner from simply converting his barred Miranda claim into a due process claim that his conviction rested on an involuntary confession. * * *
If that is so, the federal courts would certainly not have heard the last of Miranda on collateral review. Under the due process approach, * * * courts look to the totality of circumstances to determine whether a confession was voluntary. Those potential circumstances * * * include the failure of police to advise the defendant of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel present during custodial interrogation. We could lock the front door against Miranda, but not the back.
Withrow v. Williams, 507 US 680 - Supreme Court 1993
In Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976), we held that when a State has given a full and fair chance to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim, federal habeas review is not available to a state prisoner alleging that his conviction rests on evidence 683*683 obtained through an unconstitutional search or seizure. Today we hold that Stone `s restriction on the exercise of federal habeas jurisdiction does not extend to a state prisoner's claim that his conviction rests on statements obtained in violation of the safeguards mandated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966)…
We recognized that the exclusionary rule, held applicable to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), "is not a personal constitutional right"; it fails to redress "the injury to the privacy of the victim of the search or seizure" at issue, "for any `[r]eparation comes too late.' " Stone, supra, at 486 (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 637 (1965)). The rule serves instead to deter future Fourth Amendment violations, and we reasoned that its application on collateral review would only marginally advance this interest in deterrence. Stone, 428 U. S., at 493. On the other side of the ledger, the costs of applying the exclusionary rule on habeas 687*687 were comparatively great. We reasoned that doing so would not only exclude reliable evidence and divert attention from the central question of guilt, but would also intrude upon the public interest in "`(i) the most effective utilization of limited judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal trials, (iii) the minimization of friction between our federal and state systems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded.' " Id., at 491, n. 31 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 259 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)).
Over the years, we have repeatedly declined to extend the rule in Stone beyond its original bounds. In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979), for example, we denied a request to apply Stone to bar habeas consideration of a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim of insufficient evidence to support a state conviction. We stressed that the issue was "central to the basic question of guilt or innocence," Jackson, 443 U. S., at 323, unlike a claim that a state court had received evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, and we found that to review such a claim on habeas imposed no great burdens on the federal courts. Id., at 321-322.
After a like analysis, in Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979), we decided against extending Stone to foreclose habeas review of an equal protection claim of racial discrimination in selecting a state grand-jury foreman. A charge that state adjudication had violated the direct command of the Fourteenth Amendment implicated the integrity of the judicial process, we reasoned, Rose, 443 U. S., at 563, and failed to raise the "federalism concerns" that had driven the Court in Stone. 443 U. S., at 562. Since federal courts had granted relief to state prisoners upon proof of forbidden discrimination for nearly a century, we concluded, "confirmation that habeas corpus remains an appropriate vehicle by which federal courts are to exercise their Fourteenth Amendment 688*688 responsibilities" would not likely raise tensions between the state and federal judicial systems. Ibid.
In a third instance, in Kimmelman v. Morrison, supra, we again declined to extend Stone, in that case to bar habeas review of certain claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. We explained that unlike the Fourth Amendment, which confers no "trial right," the Sixth confers a "fundamental right" on criminal defendants, one that "assures the fairness, and thus the legitimacy, of our adversary process." 477 U. S., at 374. We observed that because a violation of the right would often go unremedied except on collateral review, "restricting the litigation of some Sixth Amendment claims to trial and direct review would seriously interfere with an accused's right to effective representation." Id., at 378.
In this case, the argument for extending Stone again falls short.[4] To understand why, a brief review of the derivation of the Miranda safeguards, and the purposes they were designed to serve, is in order.
The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U. S. Const., Amdt. 5. In Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532 (1897), the Court held that the Clause barred the introduction in federal cases of involuntary confessions made in response to custodial interrogation. We did not recognize the Clause's applicability to state cases until 1964, however, see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1; and, over the course of 30 years, beginning with the decision in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936), we analyzed the admissibility of confessions in such cases as a question of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 S. Ct. Rev. 99, 101-102. Under this approach, 689*689 we examined the totality of circumstances to determine whether a confession had been "`made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any sort.' " Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 513 (1963) (quoting Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613, 623 (1896)); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, at 223-227 (discussing totality-of-circumstances approach). See generally 1 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 6.2 (1984). Indeed, we continue to employ the totality-of-circumstances approach when addressing a claim that the introduction of an involuntary confession has violated due process. E. g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U. S. 279 (1991); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U. S. 104, 109-110 (1985)…
Nor does the Fifth Amendment "trial right" protected by Miranda serve some value necessarily divorced from the correct ascertainment of guilt. "`[A] system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the "confession" will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses' than a system relying on independent investigation." Michigan v. Tucker, supra, at 448, n. 23 (quoting Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, 488-489 (1964)). By bracing against "the possibility of unreliable statements in every instance of incustody interrogation," Miranda serves to guard against "the use of unreliable statements at trial." Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 730 (1966); see also Schneckloth, 412 U. S., at 240 (Miranda "Court made it clear that the basis for decision was the need to protect the fairness of the trial itself"); Halpern, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Mapp Exclusionary Rule after Stone v. Powell, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 40 (1982); cf. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979) (Stone does not bar habeas review of claim of racial discrimination 693*693 in selection of grand-jury foreman, as this claim goes to the integrity of the judicial process).
Finally, and most importantly, eliminating review of Miranda claims would not significantly benefit the federal courts in their exercise of habeas jurisdiction, or advance the cause of federalism in any substantial way. As one amicus concedes, eliminating habeas review of Miranda issues would not prevent a state prisoner from simply converting his barred Miranda claim into a due process claim that his conviction rested on an involuntary confession. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 17. Indeed, although counsel could provide us with no empirical basis for projecting the consequence of adopting petitioner's position, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 9-11, 19-21, it seems reasonable to suppose that virtually all Miranda claims would simply be recast in this way.[5]
If that is so, the federal courts would certainly not have heard the last of Miranda on collateral review. Under the due process approach, as we have already seen, courts look to the totality of circumstances to determine whether a confession was voluntary. Those potential circumstances include not only the crucial element of police coercion, Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U. S. 157, 167 (1986); the length of the interrogation, Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143, 153-154 (1944); its location, see Reck v. Pate, 367 U. S. 433, 441 (1961); its continuity, Leyra v. Denno, 347 U. S. 556, 561 (1954); the defendant's maturity, Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596, 599-601 (1948) (opinion of Douglas, J.); education, Clewis v. Texas, 386 U. S. 707, 712 (1967); physical condition, Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U. S. 519, 520-521 (1968) (per curiam); and mental health, Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U. S. 191, 196 (1957). They also include the failure of police to advise the defendant of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel present 694*694 during custodial interrogation. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 516-517 (1963); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19, n. 17; see also Schneckloth, supra, at 226 (discussing factors). We could lock the front door against Miranda, but not the back.
We thus fail to see how abdicating Miranda `s bright-line (or, at least, brighter-line) rules in favor of an exhaustive totality-of-circumstances approach on habeas would do much of anything to lighten the burdens placed on busy federal courts. See P. Bator, D. Meltzer, P. Mishkin, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 188 (3d ed. 1988, Supp. 1992); Halpern, supra, at 40; Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 865, 891 (1981); see also Quarles, 467 U. S., at 664 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)
holding that Miranda, a constitutional decision of the US Supreme Court, may not be overruled by an Act of Congress - in QUEENSBOROUGH v. United States, 2008
There are "two constitutional bases for the requirement that a confession be voluntary to be admitted into evidence: the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." - in US v. Emanuel, 2011
The law in this area is clear. This Court has supervisory authority over the federal courts, and we may use that authority to prescribe rules of evidence and procedure that are binding in those tribunals. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U. S. 416, 426 (1996). However, the power to judicially create and enforce nonconstitutional "rules of procedure and evidence for the federal courts exists only in the absence of a relevant Act of Congress." Palermo v. United States, 360 U. S. 343, 353, n. 11 (1959) (citing Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 371, 382 (1933), and Gordon v. United States, 344 U. S. 414, 418 (1953)). Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitution. Palermo, supra, at 345-348; Carlisle, supra, at 426; Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U. S. 252, 265 (1980).
But Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution. See, e. g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 517-521 (1997). This case therefore turns on whether the Miranda Court announced a constitutional rule or merely exercised its supervisory authority to regulate evidence in the absence of congressional direction. Recognizing this point, the Court of Appeals surveyed Miranda and its progeny to determine the constitutional status of the Miranda decision. 166 F. 3d, at 687-692. Relying on the fact that we have created several exceptions to Miranda `s warnings requirement and that we have repeatedly referred to the Miranda warnings as "prophylactic," New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 653 438*438 (1984), and "not themselves rights protected by the Constitution," Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 444 (1974),[2] the Court of Appeals concluded that the protections announced in Miranda are not constitutionally required. 166 F. 3d, at 687-690.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion, although we concede that there is language in some of our opinions that supports the view taken by that court. But first and foremost of the factors on the other side—that Miranda is a constitutional decision—is that both Miranda and two of its companion cases applied the rule to proceedings in state courts—to wit, Arizona, California, and New York. See 384 U. S., at 491-494, 497-499. Since that time, we have consistently applied Miranda `s rule to prosecutions arising in state courts. See, e. g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U. S. 318 (1994) (per curiam); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U. S. 146 (1990); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U. S. 675 (1988); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, 481-482 (1981). It is beyond dispute that we do not hold a supervisory power over the courts of the several States. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U. S. 209, 221 (1982) ("Federal courts hold no supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct wrongs of constitutional dimension"); Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504, 508-509 (1958). With respect to proceedings in state courts, our "authority is limited to enforcing the commands of the United States Constitution." Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U. S. 415, 422 (1991). See also Harris v. Rivera, 454 U. S. 339, 344-345 (1981) (per curiam) (stating that "[f]ederal judges . . . may not require the observance 439*439 of any special procedures" in state courts "except when necessary to assure compliance with the dictates of the Federal Constitution").[3]..
In sum, we conclude that Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively. Following the rule of stare decisis, we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves.[8] The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Scalia dissent
It takes only a small step to bring today's opinion out of the realm of power-judging and into the mainstream of legal reasoning: The Court need only go beyond its carefully couched iterations that "Miranda is a constitutional decision," ante, at 438, that "Miranda is constitutionally based," ante, at 440, that Miranda has "constitutional underpinnings," ante, at 440, n. 5, and come out and say quite clearly: "We reaffirm today that custodial interrogation that is not preceded by Miranda warnings or their equivalent violates the Constitution of the United States." It cannot say that, because a majority of the Court does not believe it. The Court therefore acts in plain violation of the Constitution when it denies effect to this Act of Congress.
Statements obtained in violation of Miranda may not be admitted in the prosecution's case-in-chief, but are admissible to impeach a defendant's trial testimony - in People v. Membreno, 2018
—a defendant was held properly impeached by a prior inconsistent statement obtained in violation of his Miranda rights: It does not follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissible against an accused in the prosecution's case in chief is barred for all purposes, provided of course that trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards.- in US EX REL. BLACKWELL v. Franzen, 1981
In Michigan v. Tucker, 4 1 7 U.S. 433 (1974), and Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), the Court severely limited the exclusionary impact of Miranda on the fruits of confessions, relying on two propositions: 1) that exclusion of the fruit of a poisonous tree is only justified if a constitutional right is violated (i.e., the "poison" must be a constitutional violation); and 2) that a violation of Miranda is not by itself a violation of the Fifth Amendment. This second argument is no longer valid after Dickerson. However, the Court in Dickerson specifically held that the "fruits" exception to Miranda retained validity even though the Miranda safeguards are constitutionally based.
In Seibert, the Supreme Court noted that one of the reasons the "question-first" strategy does not satisfy the requirements of Miranda is that "[u] pon hearing warnings only in the aftermath of interrogation and just after making a confession, a suspect would hardly think that he had a genuine right to remain silent, let alone persist in so believing once the police began to … - in Robinson v. State, 2011
He did so because "the two-step interrogation technique was used in a calculated way to undermine the Miranda warning." - in State v. O'NEILL, 2007
failure to give Miranda warnings does not require suppression of the physical fruits of the suspect's unwarned but voluntary statements "[b] ecause the Miranda rule protects again violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause, which, in turn, is not implicated by the introduction at trial of physical evidence resulting from voluntary statements - in Chandler v. FRAUENHEIM, 2018
—the Court delineated a "public safety" exception to the requirement of pre-interrogation administration of Miranda warnings. - in State v. Harris, 1996
The Supreme Court stated that Miranda warnings are not required in a situation where "police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety." - in State v. Harris, 1989
In Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968), the defendant was interrogated, while in jail, by I.RS. agents about his alleged tax evasion. The Court found that although the defendant was in jail for reasons unrelated to _the tax investigation, he was under the circumstances in custody, and the failure to give him his Miranda warnings violated his constitutional rights.
Miranda warnings must be given prior to questioning whenever an individual is in custody. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). "An individual is `in custody' when he has been formally arrested or his freedom of movement has been restrained to a degree associated with a formal arrest." United States v. Goudreau, 854 F.2d 1097, 1098 (8th Cir.1988) (citing California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (per curiam)). In United States v. Griffin we enumerated six indicia of custody:
(1) whether the suspect was informed at the time of questioning that the questioning was voluntary, that the suspect was free to leave or request the officers to do so, or that the suspect was not considered under arrest; (2) whether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of movement during questioning; (3) whether the suspect initiated contact with authorities or voluntarily acquiesced to official request to respond to questions; (4) whether strong arm tactics or deceptive stratagems were employed during questioning; (5) whether the atmosphere of the questioning was police dominated; or, (6) whether the suspect was placed under arrest at the termination of the questioning.
Id., 922 F.2d at 1349. The presence of the first three indicia tends to mitigate the existence of custody at the time of questioning; the presence of the last three indicia aggravate the existence of custody. Id.
An interrogation is " `any words or actions on the part of the police... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.'" - in State v. Holmes, 2006
—the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent - in US v. Gooch, 2012
"Interrogation" under Miranda and its progeny means both the colloquial understanding of the word, and its broader definition of "any words or actions on the part of police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect... focus [ing] primarily upon the … - in Daniel v. Commonwealth, 2020
—makes it clear that the special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are not required simply where a suspect is taken into custody, but where a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation. " `Interrogation,'as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself. " - in Alexander v. State, 1982
The determination of whether an action is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response focuses primarily on the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police - in People v. Castillo, 2014
Held: Whether the state-court decision is reviewed under § 2254(d)(1)'s standard or de novo, Mirzayance has failed to establish that his counsel's performance was ineffective. Pp. 1418-1422.
(a) The State Court of Appeal's denial of Mirzayance's ineffective-assistance claim did not violate clearly established federal law. The Ninth Circuit reached a contrary result based largely on its application of an improper review standard — it blamed counsel for abandoning the NGI claim because there was "nothing to lose" by pursuing it. But it is not "an unreasonable application of" "clearly established Federal law" for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court. See, e.g., Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 123, 128 S.Ct. 743, 169 L.Ed.2d 583. Absent anything akin to the "nothing to lose" standard in this Court's precedent, habeas relief could have been granted under § 2254(d)(1) only if the state-court decision in this case had unreasonably applied Strickland's more general standard for ineffective-assistance claims, whereby a defendant must show both deficient performance by counsel and prejudice, 466 U.S., at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The question "is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination" under Strickland "was incorrect but whether [it] was unreasonable — a substantially higher threshold." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836. And, because Strickland's is a general standard, a state court has even more latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard. Under the doubly deferential judicial review that applies to a Strickland claim evaluated under the § 2254(d)(1) standard, Mirzayance's ineffective-assistance claim fails. It was not unreasonable for the state court to conclude that counsel's performance was not deficient when he counseled Mirzayance to abandon a claim that stood almost no chance of success. Pp. 1418-1420.
(b) Even if Mirzayance's ineffective-assistance claim were eligible for de novo review, it would still fail because he has not shown ineffective assistance at all. Mirzayance can establish neither the deficient performance nor the prejudice required by Strickland. As to performance, he has not shown "that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." 466 U.S., at 687-688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Rather, counsel merely recommended the withdrawal of what he 1414*1414 reasonably believed was a claim doomed because similar medical testimony had already been rejected and the parents' testimony, which he believed to be his strongest evidence, would not be available. The Ninth Circuit's position that competent counsel might have persuaded the reluctant parents to testify is in tension with the Magistrate Judge's contrary findings and applies a more demanding standard than Strickland prescribes. The failure to show ineffective assistance is also confirmed by the Magistrate Judge's finding that counsel's decision was essentially an informed one "made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options," and was therefore "virtually unchallengeable." Id., at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The Ninth Circuit's insistence that counsel was required to assert the only defense available, even one almost certain to lose, is not supported by any "prevailing professional norms" of which the Court is aware. See id., at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Nor has Mirzayance demonstrated that he suffered prejudice, which requires a showing of "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." See id., at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In fact, it was highly improbable that the jury, having just rejected testimony about Mirzayance's mental condition in the guilt phase, would have reached a different result based on similar evidence at the NGI phase. Pp. 1420-1422.
[W] hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights." - in State v. Jimerson, 2021
And if the right to have an attorney present is invoked, the interrogation must cease until counsel is present. - in Armstrong v. State, 2019
T] he temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention involved in a traffic stop or Terry stop does not constitute Miranda custody
- in United States v. Bass, 2021
And the Shatzer Court determined that a 14-day break in custody "provides plenty of time for the suspect to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and counsel, and to shake off any residual coercive effects of his prior custody."
- in Bethel v. Crow, 2021