—"there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as `reasonable.'"
- in Traft v. Commonwealth, 2018
Katz held that communications receive Fourth Amendment protection when the speaker has an expectation of privacy that society is willing to recognize as reasonable.
"Warrantless searches ... conducted in a constitutionally protected area ... are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of the five established exceptions to the search warrant requirement." Lee v. State, 856 So.2d 1133, 1136 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). A person's home and the curtilage of the home are protected areas. See Powell v. State, 120 So.3d 577, 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986)). "
The five exceptions are for searches
(1) with the occupant's consent,
(2) incident to lawful arrest,
(3) with probable cause to search but with exigent circumstances,
(4) in hot pursuit, or
(5) pursuant to a stop and frisk." Lee, 856 So.2d at 1136 (citing Gnann v. State, 662 So.2d 406, 407 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)).
The exceptions pertinent to this case are consent and exigent circumstances. See Phuagnong v. State, 714 So.2d 527, 530 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). The State, by asserting that Inspector Brannin had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, seems to suggest a version of the stop-and-frisk exception may also be pertinent. But the State did not make this argument below, and thus, may not properly raise it on appeal. See Tillman v. State, 471 So.2d 32, 35 (Fla.1985) ("[A]n issue must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on 998*998 appeal or review must be part of that presentation if it is to be considered preserved.").
- in State v. Smith, 2015
The Court in Jones held that attachment of a Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking device to a vehicle, and the subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements on public streets, was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, reasoning that "[t] he Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information …
- in US v. Ellis, 2017
—the Supreme Court held that "[t] he government's use of trained police dogs to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings is a `search ‘within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. "
- in US v. Nasir, 2017
The Supreme Court noted specifically that the Fourth Amendment is implicated when the Government engages in a "physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area."
The area " `immediately surrounding and associated with the home is the curtilage, which is" `part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.'"
- in State v. Talkington, 2015
Decades ago, this Court held that a warrantless search of an impounded vehicle for an unsecured firearm did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433 (1973). In reaching this conclusion, the Court observed that police officers who patrol the "public highways" are often called to discharge noncriminal "community caretaking functions," such as responding to disabled vehicles or investigating accidents. Id., at 441. The question today is whether Cady's acknowledgment of these "caretaking" duties creates a standalone doctrine that justifies warrantless searches and seizures in the home. It does not.
…
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The "`very core'" of this guarantee is "`the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.'" Florida v. Jardines, 569 U. S. 1, 6 (2013).
To be sure, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all unwelcome intrusions "on private property," ibid.—only "unreasonable" ones. We have thus recognized a few permissible invasions of the home and its curtilage. Perhaps most familiar, for example, are searches and seizures pursuant to a valid warrant. See Collins v. Virginia, 584 U. S. ___, ___-___ (2018) (slip op., at 5-6). We have also held that law enforcement officers may enter private property without a warrant when certain exigent circumstances exist, including the need to "`render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.'" Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. 452, 460, 470 (2011); see also Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403-404 (2006) (listing other examples of exigent circumstances). And, of course, officers may generally take actions that "`any private citizen might do'" without fear of liability. E.g., Jardines, 569 U. S. ___, at 8 (approaching a home and knocking on the front door).
Seizures and Searches Implicate Different Interests Justice Stevens's point is that searches and seizures implicate different interests, and that the Fourth Amendment regulates searches and seizures independently. This point was later made by the Court in Soldal v. Cook County, Soldal v. Cook County . The Soldal family resided in a trailer on a rented lot. The owner of the lot removed and towed the trailer prior to an eviction hearing, while deputy sheriffs at the scene declined to intervene. The Soldals brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that their Fourth Amendment rights had been violated when their trailer was taken away.
Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures of property even where privacy and liberty interests are not implicated
- in Williams v. DISTRICT NINE DRUG TASK FORCE, 2009
Our cases unmistakably hold that the [Fourth] Amendment protects property as well as privacy.... The message of... cases [like Katz] is that property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations
- in Lyall v. City of Los Angeles, 2015
Many cases hold, for example, that abandonment of property is inconsistent with the retention of any subjective privacy or possessory interests, so police detention and investigation of abandoned property does not trigger Fourth Amendment protection. Moreover, abandonment need not be explicit. "Whether abandonment has occurred is a question of intent that may be inferred from acts, words, and other objective facts." United States v. Cofield, 272 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2001).
The Oliver majority concluded that even if the officers committed a trespass under state law, the Fourth Amendment was not violated: "in the case of open
Under the "open fields" doctrine, area beyond the curtilage is not protected by the Fourth Amendment.
- in Estate of Wasilchen v. Gohrman, 2012
The four factors are (i) "the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home";(ii) "whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home";(iii) "the nature of the uses to which the area is put"; and (iv) "the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by."
- in Commonwealth v. Sorenson, 2020
The pronoun in that holding is important. Carpenter did not address the question whether an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in a record that reveals someone else's location. Here, the GPS coordinates told MPD officers nothing about Beaudion specifically. It was only because Officer Heckard spoke with a confidential informant and overheard her conversation with Davis that he suspected Beaudion would be nearby. Obviously, Heckard's interactions with the informant were not a search. See United States v. Brathwaite, 458 F.3d 376, 380 (5th Cir. 2006) ("Audio surveillance by or with the consent of a government informant does not constitute a search." (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L.Ed.2d 453 (1971))). And nothing in Carpenter requires us to hold that Heckard's non-search became a search simply because Beaudion decided to ride with Davis. Beaudion's claim to Fourth Amendment standing therefore fails…. Even if Beaudion has standing to challenge the GPS search, he must also show the search was unreasonable. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306, 310, 135 S.Ct. 1368, 191 L.Ed.2d 459 (2015) (per curiam) ("The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches."). He has not done so.[1]
-in United States v. Beaudion, 2020
The Supreme Court held in Miller and Smith that "a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties."-- in US v. Graham, 2015
T he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed." - in Handlon v. US, 2019
Likewise, in Smith, a telephone company, at the request of the police, utilized a pen register device to record the numbers dialed from Smith's home phone.
Guest v. Leis 255 F.3d 325 (2001)
—computer users do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their subscriber information because they have conveyed it to another person—the system operator
- in LHF PRODUCTIONS, INC. v. DOES 1-15, 2016
Users would [] lose a legitimate expectation of privacy in an e-mail that had already reached its recipient; at this moment, the e-mailer would be analogous to a letter-writer, whose expectation of privacy ordinarily terminates upon delivery of the letter
- in US v. BEREZNAK, 2018
Federal courts have uniformly held that "subscriber information provided to an internet provider is not protected by the Fourth Amendment's privacy expectation" because it is voluntarily conveyed to third parties.
- in US v. Christie, 2010
California v. Greenwood (1988)
—holding Fourth Amendment protects only a "subjective expectation of privacy... that society accepts as objectively reasonable
- in State v. Allen, 2007
—the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of the home.
- in US v. Shanks, 1996
Flores has never argued that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the garbage can.
“The Court has applied the public access therefore-police-access rationale of Smith and Greenwood to aerial surveillance of private property. In California v. Ciraolo , 476 U.S. 207 (1986), Chief Justice Burger wrote for the Court as it held, 5-4, that the Fourth Amendment was not violated by aerial observation of a fenced-in backyard, from an altitude of 1,000 feet, even though the officers were operating without a warrant or probable cause.”
Ordinary Overflights: Florida v. Riley 488 U.S. 445 (1989)
says that a police helicopter hovering 400 feet above a person's property invades no reasonable expectation of privacy.
Manipulation of Bags in Public Transit
, 529 U.S. 334 (2000)
—holding that a bus passenger who places his luggage in an overhead bin retains an expectation of privacy
- in Fogg v. United States, 2021
Accordingly, "the subjective intent of the law enforcement officer is irrelevant in determining whether that officer's actions violate the Fourth Amendment...; the issue is not his state of mind, but the objective effect of his actions."
However, Under the trespass-investigation test of Jones, police activity is a search if there is a trespass for investigatory purpose.
—a traffic stop "that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission
- in People v. Chan, 2014
A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment
- in Richardson v. QUITMAN COUNTY, GA., 2012
The Supreme Court has held that a canine sniff of the exterior of a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
466 U.S. 109 (1984)
he Fourth Amendment is wholly inapplicable "to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental official."
- in US v. Stratton, 2017
A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a particular substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy
- in US v. Davis, 2012
United States v. Wilson , Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit 2021
The private search doctrine concerns circumstances in which a private party's intrusions would have constituted a search had the government conducted it and the material discovered by the private party then comes into the government's possession. Invoking the precept that when private parties provide evidence to the government on their own accord, it is not incumbent on the police to avert their eyes, the Supreme Court formalized the private search doctrine in Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980), which produced no majority decision, and United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109 (1984), which did.
Under Katz, visual inspection is not always a "search", as seen in the aerial overflight cases. But what if visual inspection is aided by sophisticated technological devices? And what if it involves a trespass
Kyllo v. United States (2001)
Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a `search ‘and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant
- in US v. Caraballo, 2013 a
"[A] Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable."
- in TK EX REL. GAGNON v. Cleveland, 2020
Defendants' first argument on summary judgment is that Ms. Gagnon cannot assert a Fourth Amendment violation, because she had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the home. "[A] Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable." Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2042, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001). "Under this test, a party asserting a violation of his or her reasonable expectation of privacy must show both: 1) an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and 2) that the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." Azam v. City of Columbia Heights, 865 F.3d 980, 989 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal quotations omitted). "The first question is a question of fact, the second is a question of law." United States v. Douglas, 744 F.3d 1065, 1069 (8th Cir. 2014). In making this assessment, "[t]here is no `single metric or exhaustive list of considerations,' but a defendant's expectation of privacy must be grounded in property law or understandings that are recognized by society." United States v. Bettis, 946 F.3d 1024, 1027 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1527, 200 L. Ed. 2d 805 (2018)). Factors that may be relevant include "ownership, possession and/or control of the area searched or item seized; historical use of the property or item; ability to regulate access; the totality of the circumstances surrounding the search; the existence or nonexistence of a subjective anticipation of privacy; and the objective reasonableness of the expectation of privacy considering the specific facts of the case." United States v. Gomez, 16 F.3d 254, 256 (8th Cir. 1994). However, "wrongful presence at the scene of a search would not enable a defendant to object to the legality of the search." Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1529 ("A burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season, for example, may have a thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy, but it is not one which the law recognizes as legitimate." (internal quotations omitted)). [TK EX REL. GAGNON v. Cleveland, 2020]
Based upon the lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle, it reasoned that "[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another. When [the codefendant] traveled over public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over …
- in State v. Winningham, 2011
---
The Court was skeptical but noted that "if such dragnet type law enforcement practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable."
A cardinal rule that emerges from the Supreme Court's caselaw is that an individual has a limited expectation of privacy in his or her public movements. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Thus, "[a] person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another." United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). In light of that rule, the Supreme Court has found no Fourth Amendment violation when the police used a tracking device placed inside a container to track an automobile on public streets. Id. at 285.
In United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), five Justices qualified this rule through separate opinions by Justices Alito and Sotomayor. These two concurring opinions reasoned that long-term surveillance using GPS tracking violated a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 414-15 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 430-31 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (distinguishing between a long-term surveillance using GPS for twenty-eight days, which he thought was impermissible, and a shorter-term surveillance of public movements).
- in LEADERS OF A BEAUTIFUL STRUGGLE v. BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT, 2020 a
For example, in Karo, the Supreme Court considered whether "the installation of a beeper in a container of chemicals with the consent of the original owner constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the container is delivered to a buyer having no knowledge of the presence of the beeper."
…
When an owner is not completely dispossessed of his property, but only suffers a trespass, it is not necessarily the case that interference causes a seizure. As discussed in the Court's April 2016 Order, the Fourth Circuit found that a "constant physical occupation" of a plaintiff's property (which resulted from a city's advertisement of a hiking trail through her backyard) "certainly constitute[d] a `meaningful interference' with [her] possessory interests." Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 487 (4th Cir. 2006). Generally, however, "[t]he existence of a physical trespass is only marginally relevant to the question of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated . . . for an actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation." United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712-13 (1984). For example, in Karo, the Supreme Court considered whether "the installation of a beeper in a container of chemicals with the consent of the original owner constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the container is delivered to a buyer having no knowledge of the presence of the beeper." Id. at 707. While acknowledging that placing the beeper in the can may have been a "technical trespass on the space occupied by the beeper," the Court found that no seizure occurred because "it cannot be said that anyone's possessory interest was interfered with in a meaningful way." Id.
- in CEDAR POINT NURSERY v. Gould, 2016
Walter v. United States (1980)
—"a wrongful search or seizure conducted by a private party does not violate the Fourth Amendment and... such private wrongdoing does not deprive the government of the right to use evidence that it has acquired lawfully."
The Court found that because the private party had not actually viewed the films, the actions of the government in viewing them was a "significant expansion of the search that had been conducted previously by a private party and therefore must be characterized as a separate search."
- in Bruce v. State, 2006
Jacobsen establishes that if an initial intrusion (at least into a container) is not covered by the Fourth Amendment, a later intrusion by police officers to the same extent is also free from Fourth Amendment constraints. While Jacobsen dealt with an initial search to which the Fourth Amendment did not apply, its principle has been held equally applicable when initial searches of containers are valid under the Fourth Amendment. For example, in Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983), government agents conducted a legal customs search of a wooden crate that was being sb;1; ed to an address in the United States, and found drugs hidden… therein. They then resealed the crate and followed it to its destination using a surveillance process called a "controlled delivery." Surveilling police ultimately saw Andreas drag the container into his apartment; when he re-emerged with it 30 to 45 minutes later, the agents searched the container without a warrant. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, reasoned that "the simple act of resealing the container to enable the police to make a controlled delivery does not operate to revive or restore the lawfully invaded privacy rights." Thus, the reopening of the container was not a search, because no legitimate expectation of privacy existed in the container at that time.
US v. Barona 1995
Two "very limited exceptions" apply. Id. One exception, clearly inapplicable here, occurs "if the circumstances of the foreign search and seizure are so extreme that they `shock the [judicial] conscience,' [so that] a federal appellate court in the exercise of its supervisory powers can require exclusion of the evidence." Id. at 490, quoting Rose, 570 F.2d at 1362 (further citations omitted). This type of exclusion is not based on our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, but rather on the recognition that we may employ our supervisory powers when absolutely necessary to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system. The wiretaps at issue cannot be said to shock the conscience. Even when no authorization for a foreign wiretap was secured in violation of the foreign law itself, we have not excluded the evidence under this rationale, Peterson, 812 F.2d at 491, nor should we. Here, the foreign courts were involved and purported to authorize the wiretaps. The conduct here, therefore, does not come close to requiring the invocation of this exception.
But if US agents substantially participate in an extraterritorial search of a US citizen and the foreign officials were essentially acting as agents for their American counterparts or the search amounted to a joint operation between American and foreign authorities, the Fourth Amendment generally applies.
- in US v. Stokes, 2013
Chief Justice Burger wrote for the Court in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), as it held that a prisoner has no constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in his prison cell or. in papers or property
Hudson v. Palmer (1984),
W] e hold that society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell and that, accordingly, the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell. The recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their individual cells simply cannot …
- in US v. Sotelo, 2015
The Eighth Amendment requires "prison officials [to] ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must `take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.'"
The U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984), in 1984. The Second Circuit issued the Cohen decision in 1986. And although various jurisdictions are divided on the issue of whether a pretrial detainee is entitled to certain minimum privacy rights to his or her cell under differing circumstances, neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Nebraska Supreme Court have further addressed the specific issue as framed by the Cohen court. See, e.g., United States v. Jeffus, 22 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 1994) (upholding search of pretrial detainee's cell on basis that defendant did not have an expectation of privacy in his jail cell); State v. Andujar, 899 A.2d 1209, 1225 (R.I. 2006) (holding "preventing the commission of serious felonies within the jailhouse [by a pretrial detainee] is a compelling reason to allow prison officials unfettered access to inmates' cells"); State v. Ramirez, 79 Conn. App. 572, 830 A.2d 1165 (2003) (because defendant did not have any reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the items within his prison cell, Fourth Amendment was not implicated when correctional officers removed a letter from defendant's cell); State v. O'Rourke, 792 A.2d 262 (Me. 2001) (applying Hudson to find that pretrial detainee lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in his jail locker and noting that State's motive for searching the locker was irrelevant); State v. Henderson, 271 Ga. 264, 517 S.E.2d 61 (1999) (court concluded Hudson does not deprive pretrial detainees of all Fourth Amendment protection); State v. Bolin, 693 So. 2d 583 (Fla. App. 1997) (finding that Hudson holding that prison inmate does not have reasonable expectation of privacy in prison cell entitling him to Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to pretrial detainees); People v. Phillips, 219 Mich. App. 159, 162, 555 N.W.2d 742, 743 (1996) (finding that "the rationale underlying the Court's decision in Hudson applies equally to pretrial detainees and inmates confined in jails"); Soria v. State, 933 S.W.2d 46, 60 (Tex. Cr. App. 1996) (reasoning in Hudson "applies in the context of pretrial detention in jail"); McCoy v. State, 639 So. 2d 163 (Fla. App. 1994) (warrantless search ordered by prosecutor solely to uncover incriminating evidence from defendant's cell, where no legitimate prison objectives justified search, violated pretrial detainee's Fourth Amendment rights); State v. Apelt, 176 Ariz. 349, 861 P.2d 634 (1993) (without discussion, Hudson applied to search of pretrial detainee's cell and person); Thomas v. State, 263 Ga. 85, 428 S.E.2d 564 (1993) (search of pretrial detainees' cells, apparently undertaken to find evidence of charged crimes, upheld on general notion of "diminished" expectation of privacy in jail cell); Lowe v. State, 203 Ga. App. 277, 416 S.E.2d 750 (1992) (warrant was required to search pretrial detainee's cell where search was not to maintain security and discipline in the prison but to further the State's effort to obtain a conviction); State v. Martin, 322 N.C. 229, 367 S.E.2d 618 (1988) (since pretrial detainee did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy within jail cell, letter obtained in search of cell was admissible).
However, the Supreme Court in TLO did not decide whether individualized suspicion is an essential element of the reasonableness standard that it adopted for searches by school authorities.
The requisite suspicion necessary to justify a search of a minor student on school grounds is a reasonable suspicion
State v. Vang Court of Appeals of Wisconsin. 2021
¶19 In Angelia D.B., Wisconsin recognized the reasonableness standard for school searches adopted by the Supreme Court in T.L.O. in order to better enable school officials to maintain safety and order. Angelia D.B., 211 Wis. 2d at 149-51, 564 N.W.2d 682. The Angelia D.B. court "recognize[d] the special needs of public-school officials to maintain a safe environment, free of disruption and conducive to learning." Id. at 156, 564 N.W.2d 682. Additionally, Angelia D.B. recognized "the growing incidence of violence and dangerous weapons in schools." Id. at 157, 564 N.W.2d 682. Similarly, in Schloegel, which extended the application of the T.L.O. standard in Wisconsin to school parking lots, we stated that school officials have a "responsibility to keep students safe on school grounds." Schloegel, 319 Wis. 2d 741, ¶¶21-22, 769 N.W.2d 130.
¶20 Other jurisdictions confronting the issue have held that the T.L.O. standard applies to searches of non-student visitors on school grounds. See, e.g., Aguilera, 287 F.Supp. 2d at 1209. A lower expectation of privacy applies generally on school grounds "because public school administrators have the heightened burden of providing a safe haven for students." Id. at 1208 (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339, 105 S.Ct. 733). Stated differently, "the rationale in T.L.O. stems from the inherent authority and responsibility of school administrators 440*440 to provide a safe environment for students." Id. at 1209. While T.L.O. addressed that issue as it related to the conduct of students, the "same need for a safe environment" also encompasses the conduct of "non-students." Id.