In the years following Johnson v. Glick, the vast majority of lower federal courts have applied its four-part "substantive due process" test indiscriminately to all excessive force claims lodged against law enforcement and prison officials under § 1983, without considering whether the particular application of force might implicate a more specific constitutional right governed by a different standard.[7] Indeed, many courts have seemed to assume, as did the courts below in this case, that there is a generic "right" to be free from excessive force, grounded not in any particular constitutional provision but rather in "basic principles of § 1983 jurisprudence."[8]
We reject this notion that all excessive force claims brought under § 1983 are governed by a single generic standard. As we have said many times, § 1983 "is not itself a 394*394 source of substantive rights," but merely provides "a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 144, n. 3 (1979). In addressing an excessive force claim brought under § 1983, analysis begins by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force. See id., at 140 ("The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit" is "to isolate the precise constitutional violation with which [the defendant] is charged").[9] In most instances, that will be either the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the person, or the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments, which are the two primary sources of constitutional protection against physically abusive governmental conduct. The validity of the claim must then be judged by reference to the specific constitutional standard which governs that right, rather than to some generalized "excessive force" standard. See Tennessee v. Garner, supra, at 7-22 (claim of excessive force to effect arrest analyzed under a Fourth Amendment standard); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U. S. 312, 318-326 (1986) (claim of excessive force to subdue convicted prisoner analyzed under an Eighth Amendment standard).
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This requires "careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight."
- in Archer v. MELCHIONDA, 2008
"The `reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. "
- in Hayes v. County of San Diego, 2013
Id. "The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation."
"[A] ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other `seizure'of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its `reasonableness' standard. "
- in FINLINSON v. Millard County, 2018
Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of "the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests" against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.
- in Bland v. Lyle, 2020
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To state a § 1983 claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment based on inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must allege "acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs."
====================
When a party moves for summary judgment, it must establish both the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Nat'l Bank of Commerce of El Dorado, Ark. v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602 (8th Cir. 1999). Only facts "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law" need be considered. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "[T]he non-movant must make a sufficient showing on every essential element of its claim on which it bears the burden of proof." P.H. v. Sch. Dist. of Kan. City, Mo., 265 F.3d 653, 658 (8th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Facts asserted by the nonmoving party "must be properly supported by the record," in which case those "facts and the inferences to be drawn from them [are viewed] in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. at 656-57. The nonmoving party "is not entitled to the benefit of unreasonable inference or inferences in conflict with undisputed facts." Linn v. Garcia, 531 F.2d 855, 858 (8th Cir. 1976). In order for there to be a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must produce evidence "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Allison v. Flexway Trucking, Inc., 28 F.3d 64, 66-67 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Where possible, on a motion for summary judgment, the Court relies "on evidence from a videotape of the incident...." Meehan v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 936, 938 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007)). As such, where one party's "version of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed him," there is no genuine dispute as to that fact. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 (admonishing the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for adopting a version of facts clearly contradicted by a videotape of the event).
Plaintiff's § 1983 unreasonable seizure claim premised on false arrest and false imprisonment must be dismissed pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Under Heck and its progeny, "in order to recover damages for harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal." Schaffer v. Beringer, 842 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2016) (citation and quotations omitted). Plaintiff's allegations of false arrest and false imprisonment arise out of her April 18, 2016 arrest. Though Plaintiff alleges that she was unlawfully arrested and detained, officers arrested her pursuant to an active warrant for criminal impersonation and obstruction. Following this arrest, Plaintiff pled guilty to the criminal impersonation charge. (Doc. 20-5, p. 1). To succeed on her § 1983 unreasonable seizure claims, Plaintiff must show that her state conviction was rendered invalid. Anderson v. Franklin Cty., Mo., 192 F.3d 1125, 1131-32 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 false arrest and false imprisonment claims where state conviction and sentence had not been rendered invalid). Because she has made no such showing, these claims must be dismissed.
Heck does not mandate dismissal of Plaintiff's § 1983 unreasonable seizure claim premised on an excessive use of force. Colbert v. City of Monticello, Ark., 775 F.3d 1006, 1007 (8th Cir. 2014) ("A finding that [Defendant] used excessive force would not necessarily imply the invalidity of [Plaintiff's] convictions.").[1] A plaintiff does not have a right to be free from all seizures; rather, the constitution only protects against unreasonable seizures. Tennessee v. Garner 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). An excessive force claim is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its "reasonableness standard." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Under Graham,
…
Having found the force employed by Sergeant Lyle and Captain Olson was reasonable, Plaintiff's claim for failure to intervene must also be dismissed. See Hollingsworth v. City of St. Ann., 800 F.3d 985 (8th Cir. 2015) (dismissing failure to train claim after granting qualified immunity on excessive force claim); see also Clark v. Ware, 873 F.Supp.2d 1117, 1122 (E.D. Mo. 2012) ("[O]fficers at the scene of an arrest can only be held liable for failing to intervene if there was an underlying violation of arrestee's constitutional rights.") (citing Putman v. Gerloff, 639 F.2d 415, 423-24 (8th Cir. 1981)).
Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim also fails. To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, Plaintiff must show:
(1) [she] engaged in a protected activity; (2) [the officers] took adverse action against her that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity; (3) the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the exercise of the protected activity; and (4) lack of probable cause or arguable probable cause.
Hoyland v. McMenomy, 869 F.3d 644, 655 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Peterson v. Kopp, 754 F.3d 594, 602 (8th Cir. 2014)). Plaintiff argues she was arrested in relation for investigating a cold case and making a public records request associated with her investigation. Even assuming Plaintiff engaged in a protected activity, her retaliation claim must be dismissed because she cannot demonstrate a causal connection between any adverse action and that protected activity.
"Under the third part of the test, `a plaintiff must show that the retaliatory motive of the officers was a "substantial factor" or "but-for-cause" of the adverse action." Id. at 657 (internal alterations omitted) (quoting Peterson, 754 F.3d at 602). "The causal connection is generally a jury question, but it can provide a basis for summary judgment when the question is so free from doubt as to justify taking it from the jury." Id. (quoting Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th Cir. 2004)). Here, Plaintiff alleges that she was arrested because she requested records as part of her investigation. However, the officers' reason for arresting Plaintiff is beyond debate—they had an active warrant for her arrest, issued on the basis that Plaintiff had been impersonating a law enforcement officer. The officers made this fact clear by telling Plaintiff they had the warrant before arresting her. Though, Plaintiff's proposed expert concludes that she "may have been retaliated against for investigating a cold case." (Doc. 22-2, p. 3) (emphasis added), this is clearly at odds with the undisputed facts. The causation question is free from doubt. Plaintiff was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant, not because she engaged in any protected activity. Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim will be dismissed.
Finally, it is questionable at best whether Plaintiff's complaint states a plausible claim for municipal liability. The Complaint makes no mention of a policy or custom, nor does it include any allegation that the officers were improperly trained. However, in light of the liberal pleading standards afforded pro se plaintiffs, even assuming Plaintiff's complaint sufficiently pleads a claim for municipal lability, those claim(s) will be dismissed because the Court has found no underlying constitutional violation.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants' motion (Doc. 19) for summary judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's claims against Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. A judgment will be entered separately.
==================
As such, Florence underscored that "courts must defer to the judgment of correctional officials unless the record contains substantial evidence showing their policies are an unnecessary or unjustified response to problems of jail security."
- in Williams v. County of Niagara, 2019 a
"A strip search that involves a stranger peering without consent at a naked individual, and in particular at the most private portions of that person's body, is a serious invasion of privacy."
—confirming the constitutionality of a routine "strip search" involving visual inspection of the body orifices before a detainee arrested during a traffic stop on an outstanding bench warrant entered the general jail population because "[c] orrectional officials have a legitimate interest, indeed a responsibility, to ensure that jails are not made less secure by reason of what new …
======================
We begin, as did the courts below, with our decision in Procunier v. Martinez, ..Our task, then, as we stated in Martinez, is to formulate a standard of review for prisoners' constitutional claims that is responsive both to the "policy of judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints and [to] the need to protect constitutional rights..
…
In four cases following Martinez, this Court has addressed such "questions of `prisoners' rights.' " The first of these, Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817 (1974), decided the same Term as Martinez, involved a constitutional challenge to a prison regulation prohibiting face-to-face media interviews with individual inmates. The Court rejected the inmates' First Amendment challenge to the ban on media interviews, noting that judgments regarding prison security "are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters." 417 U. S., at 827.
The next case to consider a claim of prisoners' rights was Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U. S. 119 (1977). There the Court considered prison regulations that prohibited meetings of a "prisoners' labor union," inmate solicitation of other inmates to join the union, and bulk mailings concerning the union from outside sources. Noting that the lower court in Jones had "got[ten] off on the wrong foot . . . by not giving appropriate deference to the decisions of prison administrators and appropriate recognition to the peculiar and restrictive circumstances of penal confinement," id., at 125, the Court determined that the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of prisoners were "barely implicated" by the prohibition on bulk mailings, see id., at 130, and that the regulation was "reasonable" under the circumstances. The prisoners' constitutional challenge to the union meeting and solicitation restrictions was also rejected, because "[t]he ban on inmate solicitation and group meetings . . . was rationally related to the reasonable, indeed to the central, objectives of prison administration." Id., at 129.
87*87 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979), concerned a First Amendment challenge to a Bureau of Prisons rule restricting inmates' receipt of hardback books unless mailed directly from publishers, book clubs, or bookstores. The rule was upheld as a "rational response" to a clear security problem. Id., at 550. Because there was "no evidence" that officials had exaggerated their response to the security problem, the Court held that "the considered judgment of these experts must control in the absence of prohibitions far more sweeping than those involved here." Id., at 551. And in Block v. Rutherford, 468 U. S. 576 (1984), a ban on contact visits was upheld on the ground that "responsible, experienced administrators have determined, in their sound discretion, that such visits will jeopardize the security of the facility," and the regulation was "reasonably related" to these security concerns. Id., at 589, 586.
In none of these four "prisoners' rights" cases did the Court apply a standard of heightened scrutiny, but instead inquired whether a prison regulation that burdens fundamental rights is "reasonably related" to legitimate penological objectives, or whether it represents an "exaggerated response" to those concerns. The Court of Appeals in this case nevertheless concluded that Martinez provided the closest analogy for determining the appropriate standard of review for resolving respondents' constitutional complaints. The Court of Appeals distinguished this Court's decisions in Pell, Jones, Bell, and Block as variously involving "time, place, or manner" regulations, or regulations that restrict "presumptively dangerous" inmate activities. See 777 F. 2d, at 1310-1312. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that Martinez had expressly reserved the question of the appropriate standard of review based on inmates' constitutional claims, but it nonetheless believed that the Martinez standard was the proper one to apply to respondents' constitutional claims.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals that the reasoning in our cases subsequent to Martinez can be so narrowly 88*88 cabined. In Pell, for example, it was found "relevant" to the reasonableness of a restriction on face-to-face visits between prisoners and news reporters that prisoners had other means of communicating with members of the general public. See 417 U. S., at 823-824. These alternative means of communication did not, however, make the prison regulation a "time, place, or manner" restriction in any ordinary sense of the term. As Pell acknowledged, the alternative methods of personal communication still available to prisoners would have been "unimpressive" if offered to justify a restriction on personal communication among members of the general public. Id., at 825. Nevertheless, they were relevant in determining the scope of the burden placed by the regulation on inmates' First Amendment rights. Pell thus simply teaches that it is appropriate to consider the extent of this burden when "we [are] called upon to balance First Amendment rights against [legitimate] governmental interests." Id., at 824.
Nor, in our view, can the reasonableness standard adopted in Jones and Bell be construed as applying only to "presumptively dangerous" inmate activities. To begin with, the Court of Appeals did not indicate how it would identify such "presumptively dangerous" conduct, other than to conclude that the group meetings in Jones, and the receipt of hardback books in Bell, both fall into that category. See 777 F. 2d, at 1311-1312. The Court of Appeals found that correspondence between inmates did not come within this grouping because the court did "not think a letter presents the same sort of `obvious security problem' as does a hardback book." Id., at 1312. It is not readily apparent, however, why hardback books, which can be scanned for contraband by electronic devices and fluoroscopes, see Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 574 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), are qualitatively different in this respect from inmate correspondence, which can be written in codes not readily subject to detection; or why coordinated inmate activity within the same prison is categorically different 89*89 from inmate activity coordinated by mail among different prison institutions. The determination that an activity is "presumptively dangerous" appears simply to be a conclusion about the reasonableness of the prison restriction in light of the articulated security concerns. It therefore provides a tenuous basis for creating a hierarchy of standards of review.
If Pell, Jones, and Bell have not already resolved the question posed in Martinez, we resolve it now: when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. In our view, such a standard is necessary if "prison administrators . . . , and not the courts, [are] to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations." Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U. S., at 128. Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration. The rule would also distort the decisionmaking process, for every administrative judgment would be subject to the possibility that some court somewhere would conclude that it had a less restrictive way of solving the problem at hand. Courts inevitably would become the primary arbiters of what constitutes the best solution to every administrative problem, thereby "unnecessarily perpetuat[ing] the involvement of the federal courts in affairs of prison administration." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S., at 407.
As our opinions in Pell, Bell, and Jones show, several factors are relevant in determining the reasonableness of the regulation at issue. First, there must be a "valid, rational connection" between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it. Block v. Rutherford, supra, at 586. Thus, a regulation cannot be sustained where the logical connection between the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy 90*90 arbitrary or irrational. Moreover, the governmental objective must be a legitimate and neutral one. We have found it important to inquire whether prison regulations restricting inmates' First Amendment rights operated in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S., at 828; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 551.
A second factor relevant in determining the reasonableness of a prison restriction, as Pell shows, is whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates. Where "other avenues" remain available for the exercise of the asserted right, see Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, supra, at 131, courts should be particularly conscious of the "measure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials . . . in gauging the validity of the regulation." Pell v. Procunier, supra, at 827.
A third consideration is the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally. In the necessarily closed environment of the correctional institution, few changes will have no ramifications on the liberty of others or on the use of the prison's limited resources for preserving institutional order. When accommodation of an asserted right will have a significant "ripple effect" on fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts should be particularly deferential to the informed discretion of corrections officials. Cf. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, supra, at 132-133.
Finally, the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U. S., at 587. By the same token, the existence of obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an "exaggerated response" to prison concerns. This is not a "least restrictive alternative" test: prison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating 91*91 the claimant's constitutional complaint. See ibid. But if an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interest, a court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard.
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"[W] hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."
—factors are:(1) whether there is "a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it";(2) "whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates";(3) "the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the …
- in Potts v. Holt, 2015
The second factor is "whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates."
But if an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests, a court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard.
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If believed, Tenison's evidence is sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Christians seeking to practice their religion in the dayroom deliberately are treated differently (and more favorably) than Muslims. Therefore, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on Tenison's equal protection claim and remand for further proceedings.
To proceed with a RLUIPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that "he wishes to engage in (1) a religious exercise (2) motivated by a sincerely held belief, which exercise (3) is subject to a substantial burden imposed by the government." Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1312 (10th Cir. 2010). Once the plaintiff shows a substantial burden, the government must demonstrate that the burden "results from a compelling governmental interest and that the government has employed the least restrictive means of accomplishing its interest." Id. at 1318 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
No one disputes that Tenison's prayers are a religious exercise or that his beliefs about his prayers are sincere. Instead, the district court decided the RLUIPA claim on the "substantial burden" prong, concluding that Tenison had failed to establish that requiring him to pray in his cell substantially burdened his religious exercise. We agree.
At a minimum, a government substantially burdens a religious exercise when it (1) "requires participation in an activity prohibited by a sincerely held religious belief," (2) "prevents participation in conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious belief," or (3) "places substantial pressure on an adherent either not to engage in conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious belief or to engage in conduct contrary to a sincerely held religious belief." Abdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at 1315. The second and third means are relevant here.[3]
…
Because Tenison has failed to establish the ban on Muslim prayer in the dayroom substantially burdens his religious exercise, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on the RLUIPA claim.
…
"[I]n order to allege a constitutional violation based on a free exercise claim, a prisoner-plaintiff . . . must first show that a prison regulation substantially burdened sincerely-held religious beliefs." Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted). The third part of the test for substantial burden under RLUIPA and the test for substantial burden under the First Amendment are similar. See Abdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at 1315. Having concluded that Tenison failed to show a substantial burden under the third part of the RLUIPA test, we further conclude that his First Amendment claim fails for the same reason.
Even if Tenison had shown a substantial burden, however, we would affirm the district court's determination that the First Amendment claim does not survive analysis under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987). Under Turner, "restrictive prison regulations are permissible if they are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, and are not an exaggerated response to such objectives," Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528 (2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (plurality opinion). Turner set forth four factors for courts to consider in assessing reasonableness:
…
Prisoners have a First Amendment right to a diet that conforms to their religious beliefs. Beerheide, 286 F.3d at 1185. Tenison has received a halal diet at CCF since at least 2015. One of his First Amendment claims arises out of a temporary suspension from the religious diet program in February 2017.
Tenison was required to sign a religious diet contract to receive halal meals. That contract prohibits inmates from "barter[ing] prepackaged kosher or halal meals." R. Vol. II at 280. McGhee e-mailed Fox that she had seen Tenison give away his halal tray and suspected he had done so as payment for having his clothes ironed. Fox then suspended the halal diet for 120 days because Tenison had "giv[en] away [his] Halal tray . . . [in] violation of the Halal diet contract." Id. at 279 (underline omitted). But ODOC does not prohibit inmates from giving away their religious diet meals. Upon consulting with the ODOC's chaplain after Tenison protested the suspension, Fox discovered that Tenison had committed no violation. As a result, Fox lifted the suspension and reinstated Tenison's halal diet. The suspension lasted approximately five to seven days.
The district court reviewed the prison's anti-bartering policy under the Turner factors and held that it was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. But given that the record shows that Tenison did not violate the anti-bartering policy, the constitutionality of the policy is not at issue. Instead of further considering the policy, we affirm on another ground. See Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1130 (10th Cir. 2011) (recognizing "we may affirm on any basis supported by the record").
…
To proceed with an Eighth Amendment claim regarding the denial of medical treatment, Tenison must make two showings, one objective and one subjective. Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1215 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 800 (2019). "First, he must produce objective evidence that the deprivation at issue was in fact sufficiently serious" to implicate the Eighth Amendment. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2005). Second, under the subjective component, Tenison must "present evidence of the prison official's culpable state of mind," Mata, 427 F.3d at 751, which requires a showing that the official knew the inmate "faced a substantial risk of harm and disregarded that risk, by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it," Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1089 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mata, 427 F.3d at 751. The district court concluded that Tenison failed to satisfy either component. We agree.
"[A] delay in medical care only constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation where the plaintiff can show that the delay resulted in substantial harm." Requena, 893 F.3d at 1216 (internal quotation marks omitted). "The substantial harm requirement may be satisfied by lifelong handicap, permanent loss, or considerable pain." Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Tenison did not argue or present evidence that the delay in treating his inability to ejaculate negatively affects his health, impairs his activities of daily living, or otherwise causes him harm, let alone substantial harm. He thus has not established the objective component.